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I. INTRODUCTION: ARE IMPACT FEES LOST IN THE MAZE OF TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE?
The cost of a new home in swanky Naples, Florida-home of
charming shopping districts, lovely white-sand beaches,1 and more
golf holes per capita than anywhere else in America 2-recently topped
$450,000. 3 Included in this cost is a staggering $33,000 impact fee bill
from the county.4 Even amidst a meltdown in the housing industry
and a severe economic slump, local politicians have refused to
reconsider the high fees. 5 Impact fees are levied by local governments
on new developments to pay a share of the costs of providing public
infrastructure for those developments. 6 The money is used to improve
sewers, roads, parks, and schools and has become increasingly
important to local governments. 7 For example, Naples's high fees are
due, in part, to cuts in revenue at the state level and voters' rejection
of a proposed sales tax increase to cover growth-related costs.8
Impact fees are not governments' only tool for financing public-
infrastructure improvements; governments also may use their powers
of eminent domain to require land dedications or payments in lieu of
1. WARREN R. BLAND, RETIRE IN STYLE: 60 OUTSTANDING PLACES ACROSS THE USA AND
CANADA 132, 135 (2005).
2. The Greater Naples Chamber of Commerce, Fun Facts, http://www.napleschamber.org
/lifestyle/naples-fun-facts.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
3. Steve Matthews, 'Bubble City,' Workers Flee Naples, Florida's High Home Prices,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&
sid=aHo6vBLGXVA&refer=us.
4. Neil Hughes, Direct Impact, SUN-HERALD.COM, Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.
impactfees.com/pdfs-all/Newsheadline2.pdf. The national average impact fee per single-family
detached dwelling recently topped $11,239. CLANCY MULLEN, DUNCAN Assocs., NATIONAL
IMPACT FEE SURVEY: 2008 (2008), available at http://www.impactfees.com
/publications%20pdf/2008_survey.pdf.
5. County Not Ready to Lower Impact Fees, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.
impactfees.com/pdfs-all/county%20not%20ready%20to%201ower%20impact.pdf.
6. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 346, 351 (2007).
7. Id. (stating that impact fees are also used to fund jails, libraries, and water treatment
and storm water facilities); Lauren Reznick, Note, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging
the Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV.
725, 736-37 (2007). For an argument against using impact fees to pay for the costs of
development, see Charles Siemon, Who Bears the Cost?, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (1987).
8. Hughes, supra note 4; see also Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next
Generation, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT
AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA 87, 87-88 (Robert H. Freilich & David W.
Bushek eds., 1995) [hereinafter EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS] (elaborating further
on the increased need for development impact fees); James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions:
Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 85-86 (1987)
(discussing federal and state governments' diminished role in financing improvements to
deteriorating public capital stock and the shifting of the burden to user fees).
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dedications.9 Often, a government will demand, as a condition
precedent to approving a development project, a "physical exaction"
(referring to a land dedication)1° or a "monetary exaction" (referring to
a payment in lieu of dedication, also known as an impact fee).1
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall
not be "taken for public use, without just compensation."'12 Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence, however, is murky; as even Justice
Stevens admitted, "[T]he wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge
great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings
jurisprudence." 13 Indisputably, judicial review of government-required
land dedications-that is, physical takings of private property-is
governed by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1 4 Fee
imposition does not take, condemn, or appropriate private property in
any traditional sense, so it should not trigger the Takings Clause. But
takings jurisprudence is not limited to the traditional understanding
of taking, condemning, or appropriating property; Justice Holmes
famously stated that a government regulation also can become a
compensable taking if the regulation "goes too far."'15  Much
uncertainty remains as to whether impact fees "go too far," and, more
fundamentally, whether impact fees should be governed by the
Takings Clause at all. Moreover, if the Fifth Amendment has an effect
on impact fees, review of the fees will have to fit somewhere in the
maze of takings jurisprudence. 16
While a unanimous Supreme Court recently cleaned up its
muddled takings jurisprudence in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., the Court
9. DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAND USE 263-64, 348-53 (2004); see also DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY:
TAKINGS 70-71 (2002) (discussing eminent domain). Land dedications refer to the actual physical
surrendering of land to the government (to widen a street, for instance). JUERGENSMEYER &
ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 269-76. Where actual physical dedications are inappropriate or not
practicable, governments may instead require a payment to be made "in lieu of the dedication."
Id. at 346.
10. Noreen A. Murphy, The Viability of Impact Fees After Nollan and Dolan, 31 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 203, 203 (1996).
11. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 351 (stating that the impact fee is
"functionally similar" to the "in lieu of' fee and the terms are "sometimes used interchangeably").
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Just Compensation Clause is applied against states as
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 234 (1897).
13. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 409-10.
15. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
16. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 346-74; see also Thomas E. Robert,
Structure and Substance of Land Use Law, in HOW TO LITIGATE A LAND USE CASE: STRATEGIES
AND TRIAL TACTICS 9, 34-35 (Larry J. Smith ed., 1999) ("[W]hether the tests of Nollan and Dolan
apply to development fees is an open question.").
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failed to clarify the future of monetary exactions like impact fees. 17 In
Lingle, Chevron brought a takings claim against Hawaii for passage of
Hawaii's Act 257,18 which sought to protect independent gasoline
dealers by, inter alia, limiting the rent that oil companies could charge
lessee-owned stations. 19 A lower court struck down the Act, reasoning
that it did not "substantially advance a legitimate state interest."20 In
overturning the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court bluntly
expurgated the "substantially advances" test, claiming it was a due
process inquiry that had "no proper place in the Court's takings
jurisprudence." 21 In so doing, the Court further clarified takings
jurisprudence by endorsing four reasonably straightforward categories
of takings: physical invasions, deprivations of all economically
beneficial use, regulatory takings, and physical exactions. 22 Whether
monetary exactions fit into any of these four categories, however, is
still unclear to scholars and courts. 23
17. Reznick, supra note 7, at 745; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548
(2005).
18. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533.
19. Id. (noting that rent was limited to fifteen percent of the stations' gross profits from the
sales of gasoline plus fifteen percent of the profits from the sales of non-gasoline products).
20. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 363 F.3d 846, 855 (8th Cir. 2004) (ruling that the Act's
practical result would actually be to reduce the number of lessee-owned stations and increase
gasoline prices), rev'd, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528.
21. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 528. For discussions about the elimination of the "substantially
advances" test, see Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., W. Andrew Gowder, Jr. & Bryan W. Wenter, Annual
Review of the Law: Recent Developments in Land Use, Planning and Zoning Law: Exactions
Update: The State of Development Exactions After Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 38 URB. LAW.
641, 641-44 (2006); Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from
Takings Doctrine, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2006); John D. Echeverria, Lingle, Etc.: The U.S.
Supreme Court's 2005 Takings Trilogy, [2006] 35 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,577.
22. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39, 547-48.
23. See Fred P. Bosselman, Dolan Works, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 333, 345-46 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) [hereinafter TAKINGS SIDES
ON TAKINGS ISSUES] (supporting heightened scrutiny for impact fees); J. David Breemer, The
Evolution of the "Essential Nexus" How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and
Dolan, and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 397 (2002) (arguing
for heightened scrutiny for all impact fees, whether legislatively or adjudicatively imposed);
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Cecily T. Talbert, Applying Nollan/Dolan to Impact Fees: A Case for the
Ehrlich Approach, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES, supra, at 333, 340-41 (supporting
heightened scrutiny for impact fees imposed adjudicatively but not legislatively); Echeverria,
supra note 21, at 10,583 (arguing that monetary exactions are "outside the scope" of Nollan and
Dolan); Daniel A. Jacobs, Indigestion from Eating Crow: The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
on the Future of Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 38 URB. LAW. 451, 481-82 (2006) (arguing that the
"mere imposition of monetary fees for building permits will fail to evoke the heightened scrutiny
of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions"); Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James C. Nicholas,
Impact Fees Should Not Be Subjected to Takings Analysis, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES,
supra, at 357, 357-58 (arguing for the use of the dual rational nexus test and against an
extension of Nollan/Dolan); Reznick, supra note 7, at 755-57 (arguing that monetary exactions
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The question of which Lingle category, if any, should guide the
analysis of impact fees is further muddled by three situations. First, in
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, a majority of the Supreme Court could
not agree on whether regulatory takings analysis is germane to an
"ordinary liability to pay money. '24 In Eastern Enterprises, the liability
derived not from an impact fee but from a government regulation
requiring a company to pay retirement benefits to coal miners. The
disparate treatment of the Takings Clause by the plurality, the
dissent, and Justice Kennedy's concurrence has led commentators to
conclude that the mere imposition of a monetary exaction cannot be
analyzed as a taking.25 Second, many states make a distinction
between legislatively imposed impact fees and fees that are imposed
on an adjudicative, ad hoc basis, and they apply different levels of
scrutiny to each.26 Commentators disagree whether bifurcation
between legislative and adjudicative impact fees is beneficial or even
relevant to takings jurisprudence. 27 Third, many states analyze
monetary exactions using a "dual rational nexus test" that is similar
to-but more rigorous than-the heightened scrutiny for physical
exactions required by Nollan and Dolan.28
This Note addresses why the assessment of an impact fee
should not be subjected to federal takings analysis but should be
analyzed under the dual rational nexus test used by most state courts.
Part II of this Note reviews the case history of impact fees as a subset
of regulatory takings. Part III analyzes the competing approaches
used to understand the relationship between impact fees and the
Takings Clause. Part IV argues that impact fees have no place in
takings jurisprudence and recommends that courts apply the dual
rational nexus test-not the Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny
analysis-to impact fees.
"regard" property and thus may be considered a compensable taking subject to heightened
scrutiny).
24. 524 U.S. 498, 529, 554-55 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also DANA & MERRILL,
supra note 9, at 70-71 (stating that five Supreme Court Justices would agree that general
financial liabilities "do not interfere with private property under the Takings Clause, and hence
may be challenged only under the Due Process Clause").
25. Echeverria, supra note 21, at 10583.
26. Curtin & Talbert, supra note 23, at 340-41.
27. Compare id. (supporting bifurcation), with Bosselman, supra note 23, at 345-46
(opposing bifurcation).
28. Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal
Constitution, 102 HARv. L. REV. 992, 993-95 (1989).
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II. BACKGROUND: FROM THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO IMPACT FEES
Per the Fifth Amendment, governments may not take private
property for public use without just compensation.2 9 "Property" in the
context of the Fifth Amendment includes not only chattels and parcels
of land but also physical rights related to the property-riparian
rights, airspace, and easements-and nonphysical rights related to the
property-trade secrets, franchises, and patent rights. 30 These rights
are among the "entire group of rights inhering in the citizen's
[ownership]" protected by the Constitution. 31 Of course, property
rights have limits; ownership does not always mean absolute
dominion.3 2 An individual's property rights may conflict with the
state's right to govern the health, safety, and general welfare of its
citizenry. 33 When government action "takes" a citizen's property right
through its power of eminent domain, the Fifth Amendment demands
that the citizen be compensated. 34 James Madison, the author of the
Takings Clause, likely intended the clause to have narrow legal
consequences: compensation would be required only where federal
government action effected a direct physical taking of private
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. For a more comprehensive discussion of property and property rights, see generally
David B. Sweet, Annotation Supreme Court's Views as to What Constitutes "Private Property"
Within Meaning of Prohibition, Under Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment, Against Taking
of Private Property for Public Use Without Just Compensation, 91 L. Ed. 2d 582 (LexisNexis
2006). See also RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 20-26 (1985) (discussing the vagueness of the terms "private property" and
"possession," but concluding that the terms are sufficiently understood to allow a discussion of
the constitutional implications of the Takings Clause).
31. CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 331 (quoting Prune Yard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 n.6 (1980)). For a discussion of whether the Constitution protects the
entire bundle of rights, each "stick" in the bundle, or only the exchangeable rights and assets, see
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 9, at 76-81.
32. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 9, at 76-81; accord John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use
Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1281 (1996)
(stating that "the first century and a half of private land ownership in America reveals no sign of
the latter-imagined right of landowners to be left alone as long as they do not harm others").
33. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) ("A prohibition simply upon the use of
property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals,
or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit."). The drafters of the Constitution never conceived that the
Takings Clause established any restrictions on government's power to regulate the use of land.
FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-
OWNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 82, 104 (1973).
34. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 9, at 3-4.
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property.35 The subsequent broadening of this early understanding of
direct takings and the Takings Clause is examined in Section A.
Section B examines the current, broader understanding of the Takings
Clause, which includes regulatory takings, physical exactions and, in
some states, impact fees.
A. Brief History of Regulatory Takings and Exactions
In 1880, forty years before the ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, Kansas amended its own constitution
to "forever prohibit" the "manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
... except for medical, scientific, and mechanical purposes."36 The next
year, the state prosecuted Peter Mugler, a brewer who defied the ban
by manufacturing and selling intoxicating liquors for consumption.
37
Mugler argued that he had a vested interest in continuing to
manufacture and sell beer and that the amendment, which caused his
brewery to drop in value from $10,000 to $2,500, constituted an
unconstitutional, uncompensated taking.38  The Kansas Supreme
Court disagreed, finding no vested interest and no takings violation.
39
35. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708-13 (1985); see also DANA &
MERRILL, supra note 9, at 77-78 (explaining that the original intent of the Takings Clause was
to limit the power of eminent domain by which the State physically takes assets that can be
exchanged on a stand-alone basis). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 26-29 (elaborating on the
difficulties inhering in grounding a theory of the Takings Clause in the intentions of the parties
who drafted or signed the document); id. at 16-19, 25 (stating that though colonial practice
limited compensation to state action amounting to a transfer of possession or title of land, there
is no "affirmative evidence suggesting that the Framers regarded the Takings Clause as being
limited to physical appropriations," and none of the drafters or ratifiers of the Takings Clause-
including James Madison-had "given any sustained thought to the purpose of eminent domain
and the compensation requirement"). The Takings Clause itself is often referred to as the
"Eminent Domain Clause," leading to an understanding that the clause was intended to govern
situations where the State seeks to acquire a discrete asset for which it is possible to pay just
compensation, which is consistent with early practice. Id. at 16-17, 71-72. For a more complete
explanation of the original understanding of the Takings Clause, see id. at 8-16.
36. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 654.
37. State v. Mugler, 29 Kan. 252, 267 (1883), affd, 123 U.S. 623.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 273. The court concluded that the vested interest claim failed because Mr. Mugler
had no vested right to "either manufacture or sell any kind of intoxicating liquor which had not
yet been brought into existence"; the takings claim failed because:
It may be that the defendant has suffered great loss on account of the passage of the
prohibition act, but such loss is not the direct and immediate result of such act; it is
simply the remote and consequential result of the act, and is wholly speculative and
problematical. Such indirect and remote losses cannot render acts of the legislature
unconstitutional.
Also see RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE 18TH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL
CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, at 41 (1995), for more discussion of the Mugler case.
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On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Kansas ruling and
explained that a prohibition on uses of property that the state
declared "to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an
appropriation of property for the public benefit."40 Under this early
view, regulations that were reasonably related to a valid public
purpose never could constitute a taking.41
A half-century later, the Mugler view was still in effect when
the Supreme Court used similar language to uphold comprehensive
zoning ordinances. In 1922, the Village of Euclid, Ohio, passed a
zoning ordinance limiting property rights to enumerated uses in
specifically zoned areas of town.42 A realty company whose land
diminished in value on account of the regulations sued to invalidate
the ordinance. 43 The Court held that only provisions that are "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare" are
unconstitutional. 44  The Court explained that it would uphold
government zoning regulations so long as the government's rationale
for the regulation was "fairly debatable."45  Euclid further
demonstrates the historical reluctance of the Supreme Court to extend
40. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69. Mugler further rationalizes the denial of a takings claim by
stating:
Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for
lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the
State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the
public interests. Nor can legislation of that character come within the Fourteenth
Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is not to protect the
community, or to promote the general well-being, but, under the guise of police
regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process of
law.
Id.
41. CALLIES, FREILICH, & ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 311. For a history of colonial republican
views concerning the Takings Clause prior to Mugler, see BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, supra
note 33, at 82-118; Treanor, supra note 35, at 694.
42. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926). The ordinance created
zones labeled U-1 to U-6. A U-1 zone, for instance, was limited to uses such as single family
dwellings, public parks, water towers and farming, while sewer and garbage plants, incinerators,
penal institutions and institutions for the "insane and feeble-minded" were grouped in U-6 zones.
Id. at 380-82. This is an example of what is called "use zoning"-zoning intended to promote the
general welfare by prohibiting property uses in certain areas due to their harmful effects. See
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 70-92.
43. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384-85.
44. Id. at 395; see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928) (upholding
Euclid and its "substantial relation to public health, morals, safety, or welfare" reasoning).
45. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. This reflects the belief rooted in colonial republicanism that
state claims can trump private ownership claims and that state legislatures, on account of their
wisdom and lack of power, could be trusted to act according to the common good. See Treanor,
supra note 35, at 700-01.
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the Takings Clause to government acts not resulting in direct physical
takings of property and a concomitant willingness on the part of the
Court to grant to governments broad discretion to regulate public
health, morals, and safety despite the negative impact the regulations
might have on private property use and value.
Soon after Euclid, the Court began broadening its
understanding of the Takings Clause. In the 1920s, Pennsylvania
attempted to protect people from the danger of having coal mined from
beneath their homes.46 The resulting legislation, however, abrogated a
contract that the Pennsylvania Coal Company had made with the
plaintiffs allowing it to mine beneath their homes.47 Thus, the
legislation completely deprived the company of a valuable estate in
land. Justice Holmes famously stated that "[t]he general rule at least
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."48 For the first
time, the Court recognized the possibility of a regulation effecting an
unconstitutional taking.49
For nearly half a century thereafter, when faced with balancing
private property rights against public interests, states were left alone
to flesh out the bare-boned "goes to far" doctrine. 50 Not until Penn
46. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922).
47. Id. at 412, 414.
48. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). This reflects another early American belief that manifested
first in Vermont and then grew increasingly pervasive as states gained experience with state
legislatures: that state legislatures could not be trusted to secure individual property rights. See
Treanor, supra note 35, at 704-05. The seeds of this "liberalism" that countered the colonial
republicans' faith in legislatures referred to in supra note 35 can at least partly be attributed to
the influence of Sir William Blackstone, a strong advocate of individual rights of property, who
wrote, "So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize
the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community." WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *134-35.
49. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (stating that prior to
Pennsylvania Coal "it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct
appropriation' of property or the functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's]
possession' " (citations omitted)).
50. MICHAEL M. BERGER, REGULATORY TAKINGS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIMER 4 (1994) (stating that after Pennsylvania Coal "the Supreme Court
essentially entered a period of hibernation, seemingly abandoning this field of the law"). In
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), the sole Supreme Court case addressing land-use
in the half century after Pennsylvania Coal, the Court continued to emphasize deference toward
the other branches of government and a desire for the Court not to substitute its own judgments
for reasonable state solutions of regulatory matters. ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM &
RICHARD M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 244-45 (1999). For an example of how state courts addressed the
issue, see Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949). In Ayers, the City of Los
Angeles required a developer to dedicate two ten-foot-wide strips of land to widen an existing,
abutting boulevard and to plant trees alongside. Id. at 3. The developer objected, claiming that
the City could only exact land to build streets within the subdivision, not to widen existing
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Central Transportation Co. v. New York in 1978 did the Supreme
Court reenter the Takings Clause fray by enunciating three factors for
determining whether a regulatory taking "goes too far." In Penn
Central, a New York City statute requiring the preservation of
historically and aesthetically important buildings prevented Penn
Central Transportation Company from constructing a fifty-five-story
office tower atop Grand Central Terminal. 51 The Court upheld the
statute and held that when governmental regulatory action injurious
to a property owner requires just compensation, courts should
consider: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct,
investment-backed expectations; and (3) whether the nature of the
governmental action is a physical invasion or merely a public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life in an attempt to
promote the common good.52
The Court has since added two hard-and-fast requirements
necessary to find per se takings: (a) there must be an actual, physical
invasion of property, no matter the extent or economic impact on the
owner;53 and (b) the regulation must deny the landowner completely of
all economically beneficial use of her property. 54 However, where there
is no physical invasion and only partial deprivation of the beneficial
use, Penn Central's factors must be weighed. 55
The Penn Central factors and the two "per se" rules guide the
analysis of three of Lingle's four takings categories: regulatory
takings, physical invasions, and deprivations of all economically
streets. Id. at 4. The California Supreme Court upheld the City's provision applying a standard
very deferential to local ordinances. Id. at 7-8. Other states applied different standards with
varying degrees of deference to local authorities for determining when a regulation "goes too far"
and becomes a taking. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 216-30 (detailing application by states of
the reasonable relationship test, the specific and uniquely attributable test, and the rational
relationship test).
51. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 116-18 (1978). In denying the
request for the addition, the Landmarks Preservation Commission, the body charged with
ensuring compliance with the statute, called the balancing of a fifty-five story office tower atop "a
flamboyant Beaux-Arts fagade... nothing more than an aesthetic joke." Id. at 117.
52. Id. at 124; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (discussing the Penn Central factors to be
considered).
53. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (finding
a per se taking where there is even minimal physical invasion: state law required a landlord to
attach cables on an apartment's exterior walls and a one and one-half foot box on the roof); see
also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (reaffirming the per se rule for
physical invasion).
54. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, where the South Carolina
Coastal Commission passed a statute preventing plaintiff from constructing anything on his
beach property).
55. Id.
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beneficial use. The Court has carved out a distinct analysis for the
fourth category-physical exactions-an analysis that also has been
applied by some states to monetary exactions like impact fees. 56
B. Physical Exactions and Nollan and Dolan
Physical exactions are a technique employed by governments to
compel developers-by regulation, negotiation, or leverage-to
exchange land for permission to develop.5 7 Rather than merely
weighing the Penn Central factors, courts apply heightened scrutiny to
physical exactions. For a physical exaction to be permissible, there
must be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and the
government interest that justifies the denial of the permit,58 and there
must be "rough proportionality" between the exaction and the impact
of the proposed development. 59 Together, the essential nexus test and
rough proportionality test constitute Nollan/Dolan heightened
scrutiny.
The essential nexus test derives from Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission
granted permission to James and Marilyn Nollan to replace their
dilapidated beachfront bungalow with a new, larger home on the
condition that the Nollans grant a public easement for their private
beach. 60 The Commission justified the condition by arguing that the
proposed development had negative externalities: it would impede the
public's ability to see the beach and would create a "psychological
barrier" to using the beach. 61 The Court countered with what is
termed the "essential nexus" argument: state police power may
prohibit an activity and limit a constitutional right (like prohibiting a
person from yelling "fire" in a crowded theater, which limits freedom
of speech), but it may not allow exceptions to the prohibition based on
unrelated conditions (like allowing persons who contribute $100 to
state coffers to yell "fire" in crowded theaters); there must be an
"essential nexus" between the condition and the prohibition.62 The
Court found no "essential nexus" between the required exaction
56. Id. at 538, 545-47 (describing land-use exactions as a "special context" and analyzing
them separately).
57. See Siemon, supra note 7, at 115 n.2 (describing development exactions generally).
58. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
59. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
60. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387 (labeling California's ploy a
"gimmick").
61. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835.
62. Id. at 836.
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(requiring a permanent public right of access to private property) and
the ends advanced as the justification for the prohibition on
development (improving the public's view of the ocean and
diminishing the psychological barrier).63 Thus, the dedication was an
"out-and-out plan of extortion" and an unconstitutional taking. 64
Nollan's essential nexus test requires physical exactions to
"substantially advance the same government interest that would
furnish a valid ground for denial of the permit."65
After Nollan, it was still unclear to what degree the exaction
would need to address the impact of the proposed development. 66
Subsequently, the Court determined that the exaction must have a
"rough proportionality" to the development impact.67 When Florence
Dolan applied for a permit to increase the size of her store and to pave
a parking lot, the city approved the permit subject to two conditions:
Ms. Dolan would have to dedicate a portion of the back side of her lot
as a public greenway and an adjacent strip as a public
pedestrian/bicycle pathway. 68 The city justified these dedications by
arguing that they would improve storm drainage and reduce vehicular
traffic. 69 Reiterating that the right to exclude others from private
property is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of [property]
rights," the Supreme Court explained that a private greenway could
improve flood control just as well as a public greenway.70 The Court
also rejected the city's finding that the pedestrian/bicycle path
theoretically could offset increased traffic from expanding the store;
absent a finding that the path would or was likely to offset increased
traffic, the demanded property dedication was unjustified.7 1 Thus, the
government under Dolan must show that there is not only an
"essential nexus" between the physical exaction and the justification
for permit denial but also "rough proportionality" between the impact
63. Id. at 837.
64. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584 (1981)).
65. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005). Note that this is not the same
as requiring that the conditions substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest, which
is a due process question. Id. at 540.
66. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (noting that the Court was "not
required to reach [the exaction] question in Nollan").
67. Id. at 391.
68. Id. at 379-80.
69. Id. at 387.
70. Id. at 384-86.
71. Id. at 395.
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of the development and the requirements of the exaction. 72 Rough
proportionality essentially requires the public interest served by the
exaction to be sufficient to justify the taking.73
As part of its analysis, the Court placed physical exactions in
the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions."74 This
doctrine prevents the government from requiring "a person to give up
a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation
when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit
has little or no relationship to the property."75 In cases like Nollan and
Dolan, the government may not condition the approval of a building
permit on the surrender of the right to exclude others from property.
The Court has acknowledged that Nollan/Dolan heightened
scrutiny for takings questions has not been applied outside the context
of physical exactions in federal courts. 76 Many state courts, however,
do apply heightened scrutiny to monetary exactions. 77 These courts
see little difference in the imposition of a physical exaction and a
monetary exaction and use the language of Nollan and Dolan to guide
the analysis of monetary exactions. 78 Other courts, however, argue
that Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny is inappropriate outside the
context of physical exactions of property. 79 The question remains
72. Id. at 391 (explaining that the "rough proportionality" test is essentially the same as the
"reasonable relationship" test adopted by the majority of states, i.e., the dedication must be
reasonably related to the impact of the proposed development).
73. Daniel Pollak, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Tries to Prune Agins Without
Stepping on Nollan and Dolan, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 925, 930 (2006) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at
385).
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385).
76. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (stating that the Court
has "not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of
exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property
to public use").
77. See, e.g., Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 14 P.3d 172, 175 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2000) (applying Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny to impact fees and stating that the
issues for an exaction of money are the same as for an exaction of land, and so the "test must be
the same: a showing of 'nexus' and 'proportionality' "), affd on nonconstitutional grounds, 49 P.3d
860 (Wash. 2002). But see Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 693-94 (Colo.
2001) (refusing to apply Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny to impact fees); Home Builders Ass'n
of Dayton v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000) (applying the dual rational
nexus test to impact fees, which is similar to, but is not, Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny).
78. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996).
79. See, e.g., Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir. 1995); Nancy E.
Stroud, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey and Its Implications for Local
Government Exactions, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 195, 203-04 (1999) (discussing the Fifth
and Tenth Circuits' treatment of Dolan, and treatment in various state courts); see also Bruce W.
Bringardner, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications: National and Texas Law After Dolan and
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whether Supreme Court Takings Clause jurisprudence is applicable to
impact fees and, if so, what analysis applies.
III. ANALYSIS: FOUR APPROACHES TO IMPACT FEES
Four positions have emerged in the debate over whether
takings law applies to impact fees. 0 The first position is that
Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny only applies to mandatory
dedications of land and not to impact fees. Proponents of the second
position argue that Nollan/Dolan should not apply to impact fees
because virtually all states apply a more stringent common-law test-
the dual rational nexus test. The third position is that Nollan/Dolan
should not apply to generally applicable impact fees imposed by
legislatures but should apply to impact fees imposed adjudicatively on
individuals. The fourth position is that Nollan/Dolan should apply to
all impact fees.81
A. Nollan/Dolan Does Not Apply to Impact Fees
The Supreme Court has made statements that limit
Nollan/Dolan to physical exactions and that call into question the
applicability of takings jurisprudence to "ordinary obligations to pay
money."8 2 In Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, developers
attempted to build residential units on an ocean front parcel that was
also a buckwheat stand, the natural habitat of a rare butterfly.8 3
Though the builder modified the development plan to meet the local
planning commission's requirements, the planning commission
repeatedly denied permission to develop.8 4 In its analysis of Del Monte
Dunes, the Court stated:
We have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context
of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication
of property to public use. The rule ... was not designed to address, and is not readily
Del Monte Dunes, 32 URB. LAW. 561, 582 n.81 (reviewing cases in which the courts refused to
apply Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny to situations that did not include development
exaction).
80. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 368.
81. Id.
82. See Stroud, supra note 79, at 202 (arguing Del Monte Dunes's language limits
Nollan/Dolan to the special context of physical exactions); Reznick, supra note 7, at 749 (arguing
that E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), should not be seen as an imposition to applying the
Nollan/Dolan test to impact fees).
83. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 695 (1999).
84. Id. at 695-96.
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applicable to, the ... questions arising where, as here, the landowner's challenge is
based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development.
8 5
In Lingle, a unanimous Court cited this language approvingly,
supporting the idea that Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny is limited
to cases in which government action is so onerous that, outside the
development exchange context, it would amount to a per se physical
taking.8 6 Because a requirement to pay a fee does not resemble a per
se physical taking,8 7  some courts have limited Nollan/Dolan
heightened scrutiny to land-dedication cases.88 Many other courts
have reconsidered cases in which Dolan was applied to non-land-
dedication situations and decided, in light of Del Monte Dunes, that
Dolan was inapposite.8 9
The Supreme Court's clear statement in Del Monte Dunes that
Dolan's rough proportionality test has not been extended beyond
property dedications does not necessarily mean that it cannot, or
should not, be extended in an appropriate circumstance. Del Monte
Dunes did not expressly address the extension of Nollan and Dolan to
impact fees, so its ruling has limited value.90 Likewise, though both
the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits have refused to apply Nollan and
Dolan to non-land-dedication situations, neither circuit has addressed
impact fees directly. 91 Furthermore, some courts directly confronting
the impact fee question, like the Ehrlich court, have determined that
85. Id. at 702-03 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
86. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005); Pollak, supra note 73, at
931. But see Bringardner, supra note 79, at 582 (arguing that Del Monte Dunes's statement that
the Supreme Court has "not extended the Dolan test beyond dedications is merely an
acknowledgement that the Supreme Court has not been presented with the opportunity to
examine non-possessory exactions under Dolan," and that, as dicta, the statement should not be
interpreted to mean that Dolan applies to land dedications only).
87. Pollak, supra note 73, at 931.
88. The Kansas Supreme Court, for instance, refused to apply Nollan/Dolan to a dispute
over the imposition of a traffic impact fee because the fee did not involve the dedication of land.
McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (stating that "[tihe landowners cite
no authority for the critical leap which must be made from a fee to a taking of property").
89. See Stroud, supra note 79, at 205-06.
90. See Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battleground, 14 P.3d 172, 175 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000) (stating that Del Monte Dunes's language is inapposite because the case did not address
impact fees); see also Bringardner, supra note 79, at 585 (arguing that Del Monte Dunes does not
limit the application of Nollan/Dolan to land dedications and their equivalents).
91. See Tex. Manufactured House Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir.
1996) (distinguishing Nollan on the basis that its plaintiff was required to dedicate land); Clajon
Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir. 1995) (repeating merely that Nollan/Dolan
are limited to development exactions where there is a physical dedication or its equivalent).
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the reasons justifying heightened scrutiny in Nollan and Dolan also
justify heightened scrutiny for some impact fees. 92
The Supreme Court's split decision in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel has led commentators to argue that impact fees, as ordinary
liabilities to pay money, fall outside the limits of all takings
jurisprudence. 93 In Eastern Enterprises, impact fees were analogized
to a tax or a routine burden to pay money,94 and the Court split on
whether the statutory obligation to pay money ever could form the
basis of a takings claim. 95 The case concerned Eastern, an energy
company long since removed from the coal business, and its obligation
to pay coal miners' pensions under the Coal Act. 96 The plurality
opinion applied the Penn Central test, finding that the Coal Act
effected a taking because the Act profoundly affected Eastern's
business, substantially interfered with Eastern's reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and was unrelated to any
commitment Eastern had made or any injury it caused.97 Justice
Kennedy concurred in the judgment but found it imprecise and unwise
to analyze the mere imposition of an obligation to pay a benefit under
the Takings Clause. 98  He argued that application of takings
jurisprudence to an "ordinary obligation to pay money" would remove
a consistent limitation in regulatory takings analysis: the requirement
that there be a specific property right or interest at stake. 99 Instead,
Justice Kennedy applied due process analysis. 00
92. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (Cal. 1996); cf. DAVID L. CALLIES,
DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR. & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK
ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS,
VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 21-22 (2003) (discussing cases that
have questioned limiting Nollan/Dolan to physical dedications).
93. Echevarria, supra note 21, at 10,583 & n.52; Reznick, supra note 7, at 749.
94. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 556 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Contra
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 357-58 (distinguishing impact fees from taxes).
For a discussion about the differences between taxes and special assessments, see RICHARD
ALLEN EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 283-89
(1985) (concluding that a rigid distinction between the two is futile and that special assessments
are routinely upheld). The problem is that if impact fees are characterized as taxes they will
almost always be stricken, since local governments rarely have the authority to assess taxes
beyond property tax and, occasionally, sales or income tax. CALLIES, CURTIN & TAPPENDORF,
supra note 92, at 13.
95. Reznick, supra note 7, at 750.
96. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 505-07, 514.
97. Id. at 536 (applying the Penn Central test for regulatory takings).
98. Id. at 540.
99. Id. at 541-42.
100. Id. at 547.
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The dissenters, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and
Stevens, 101 also found takings jurisprudence inapplicable, seeing no
reason to torture the Takings Clause to fit a case involving an
ordinary liability to pay money.102 After all, the dissent argued, if the
Takings Clause does not apply to a tax requiring A to pay the
government, why should it apply when the government orders A to
pay B? 10 3 The dissent agreed with Kennedy that due process review
governed the analysis and argued that the Takings Clause was limited
to instances in which the government takes specific and identifiable
property rights.10 4 Coupling Kennedy with the dissenters appears to
create a "second majority" opposed to the extension of takings
jurisprudence to impact fees.10 5
The Third Circuit agreed that Eastern Enterprise limits the
application of the Takings Clause to takings of specific property
rights. In two unrelated suits, companies subject to the Coal Act used
Eastern Enterprises to claim that the obligation to pay benefits to coal
workers effected a taking of private property. 10 6 In each case the Third
Circuit felt "bound to follow the five-four vote against the takings
claim" in Eastern Enterprises and applied due process analysis to
101. Id. at 550, 553.
102. Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id.; see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 233 (1986) ("[I1t
cannot be said that the Takings Clause is violated whenever legislation requires one person to
use his or her assets for the benefit of another.").
104. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 554-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The 'private property' upon
which the Clause traditionally has focused is a specific interest in physical or intellectual
property."); id. at 542:
The difficulties in determining whether there is a taking or a regulation even where a
property right or interest is identified ought to counsel against extending the
regulatory takings doctrine to cases lacking this specificity. The existence of at least
this outer boundary for application of the regulatory takings rule provides some
necessary predictability for governmental entities.
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 6.02, at 6-7 (Supp.
2006) (arguing that five Justices disagreed with the plurality's opinion that property had been
unconstitutionally taken). But see Reznick, supra note 7, at 751 (arguing that Justice Kennedy's
concurrence cannot be clumped in with the dissenters so easily). For a discussion on how the
view that takings jurisprudence is limited to instances where the State takes specific and
identifiable property rights is consistent with the understanding that the clause exists to curb
the State's eminent domain power, but "makes less sense" if one believes the clause exists as a
type of check against unfair or inefficient government action, see DANA & MERRILL, supra note 9,
at 71-72.
105. Echeverria, supra note 21, at 10,583.
106. Berwind Corp. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 307 F.3d 222, 224 (3d Cir. 2002); Unity Real
Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 655-56 (3d Cir. 1999).
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uphold the Act's obligations. 1 7 The court explained a fundamental
difference between takings and substantive due process claims: "If the
government pays just compensation, it may take property for public
use under the Takings Clause. Due process protections, by contrast,
define what the government may not require of a private party at
all."'108 The Third Circuit, like the dissenters and Kennedy in Eastern
Enterprises, determined that because the Coal Act did not involve
compensation payments by the government for property taken, but
instead pushed the limit of what the government may require of a
private party, due process jurisprudence applies 19 Thus, one view
that has emerged is that "ordinary obligations to pay money" are best
reviewed under a substantive due process analysis and not a takings
analysis.
B. The Dual Rational Nexus Test Obviates the Need to Apply
Nollan/Dolan to Impact Fees
Scholars have argued that no labyrinthine takings analysis of
impact fees is even necessary because states already apply the more
stringent "dual rational nexus" test, which sufficiently protects
property rights. 110 This common-law test demands (1) extensive
calculation of the needs for infrastructure improvement created by a
proposed development and (2) earmarking of the fees to benefit the
development.'' The two "rational nexuses" often are referred to as the
"need" and "benefit" tests." 2
107. Berwind, 307 F.3d at 234 & n.16, 239-40; Unity Real Estate, 178 F.3d at 659. Both
cases, however, admit that it is difficult to distill a guiding principle from Eastern Enterprises.
Berwind, 307 F.3d at 231 (quoting Unity Real Estate, 178 F.3d at 658).
108. Unity Real Estate, 178 F.3d at 658-59.
109. Id. at 659-60. The limit pushed by Congress in the Coal Act was forcing retroactive and
substantial monetary liability on companies for coal miner benefits when those companies were
not even signatories to the liability-creating agreements and had long since left the mining
industry. Id.
110. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 365-68; Juergensmeyer & Nicholas,
supra note 23, at 361; see also Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact
Fee Enabling Legislation, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 60, 61-
62 (stating that all states, regardless of what they call the test they use, judge the
reasonableness or rationality of impact fees by analyzing stringent factors).
111. Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 362-63; Leitner & Schoettle, supra note
110, at 61-62 (listing the factors weighed when analyzing impact fees).
112. Note, supra note 28, at 994; see also Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,
760 So. 2d 126, 134 (Fla. 2000) (discussing applications of the need and benefit tests); Hollywood
Inc. v. Broward Co., 431 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (describing the need and
benefits tests):
[R]easonable dedication or impact fee requirements are permissible so long as they
offset needs sufficiently attributable to the subdivision and so long as the funds
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The initial formulation for the dual rational nexus test is
attributed to Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls.113 In Jordan, the
city required a developer to pay a $5,000 fee in lieu of dedicating land
for parks and schools to serve a proposed development. 1 4 In
sustaining the fee, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that a burden
cast upon a developer is permissible when "specifically and uniquely
attributable to his activities."'1 15 The Jordan court went further,
declaring that generally it would be impossible for a city to prove that
the land dedication required for a park or a school was to meet a need
"solely attributable to the anticipated influx of people into the
community to occupy this particular subdivision."' 16 Therefore, so long
as the evidence "reasonably establish[ed]" the need fulfilled by the
dedication, the dedication would be upheld.1 17 Thus, the first part of
the dual rational nexus test requires the municipality to demonstrate
that a developer's activity generates a need for new facilities." 8
Variations of the dual rational nexus test exist in the various states,
but there is "virtual unanimity" that impact fees may only require a
new development to pay for costs that are reasonably related to its
impact.119
The second test, inferred from Jordan, requires a city to use
the funds collected specifically for the enumerated benefit to the
development. 20 To achieve this, a city can earmark the funds collected
to benefit the new residents and demonstrate that the city's actual or
collected are sufficiently earmarked for the substantial benefit of the subdivision
residents. In order to satisfy these requirements, the local government must
demonstrate a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the need for
additional capital facilities and the growth in population generated by the subdivision.
In addition, the government must show a reasonable connection, or rational nexus,
between the expenditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the
subdivision. In order to satisfy this latter requirement, the ordinance must specifically
earmark the funds collected for use in acquiring capital facilities to benefit the new
residents. The developer, of course, can attempt to refute the government's showing by
offering additional evidence.
113. Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 361. The dual rational nexus test is also
referred to as the "reasonable relationship" test.
114. Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Wis. 1965).
115. Id. at 447 (citing Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Vill. of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
902 (Ill. 1961)).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 448.
118. Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 361.
119. See CLANCY MULLEN, DUNCAN ASSOCS., STATE IMPACT FEE ENABLING ACTS (2008),
available at www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/state-enabling-acts.pdf.
120. Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 362.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
projected capital expenditures as a result of the development exceed
the capital payments required of the developer.121
The dual rational nexus test seems similar to the heightened
scrutiny required by Nollan/Dolan. In fact, in Dolan the Supreme
Court relied heavily on the test used in Jordan in devising its rough
proportionality test, changing the name principally to avoid confusion
with the rational basis test of equal protection jurisprudence. 122 After
discussing the unnecessarily exacting requirements of the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test and the excessively lax requirements
of other states' tests, the Supreme Court noted that the dual rational
nexus test "adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer to the
federal constitutional norm."1 23 However, the tests are not the same.
The essential difference between the two tests is that the dual rational
nexus test requires not merely a "roughly proportional" relationship
between the burden imposed by the exaction and the impact of the
development but much more detail and specificity regarding how a
developer's activity creates a need for new facilities and how the city's
expenditures will benefit the development. 124
Commentators have pointed out two arguments militating
against a federal adoption of the dual rational nexus test.1 25 First, the
Supreme Court doubts the competency of federal judges to construct
detailed equations of harm and benefit-as would be required by the
dual rational nexus test-in an attempt to second-guess legislative
action. 126 Second, applying the dual rational nexus test to monetary
exactions presumes that developers are unable to protect themselves
politically, contradicting the Supreme Court's belief that the political
process is ultimately self-regulating.1 27 The argument, however, is not
121. Id.; see also Nicholas, supra note 8, at 93-94 (stating that impact fees are valid where:
(1) the new development requires expansion of capital facilities; (2) the required fee does not
exceed the cost incurred by the local government; and (3) the money collected is spent for the
purposes collected).
122. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1994) (citing Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 448,
and referring to the test as the "reasonable relationship" test).
123. Id.
124. See MELTZ, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 50, at 251-52 (discussing Dolan and stating
that the Supreme Court "did not adopt the reasonable relationship test per se," and addressing
the dissenters who point out that Dolan's roughly proportional test is not "anything akin" to
existing state tests (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 399 (Stevens, J., dissenting))); Note, supra note
28, at 993 (discussing Nollan). The reasonable relationship test, also called the dual rational
nexus test, requires specific, detailed analysis regarding how a developer's activity creates a need
for new facilities and how the city's expenditures will benefit the development. Juergensmeyer &
Nicholas, supra note 23, at 361-62.
125. Note, supra note 28, at 1001-12.
126. Id. at 1001.
127. Id. at 1002.
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that the Court has adopted or should adopt the dual rational nexus
test into its takings analysis but that impact fees should be exempted
from takings analysis altogether.128
Scholars argue that the dual rational nexus test actually
protects property rights better than Nollan/Dolan heightened
scrutiny. 129 Whereas Dolan's "rough proportionality" does not require
precise mathematical calculations--only "some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development" 130 -most state
courts and statutes require municipalities to make considerable efforts
to quantify the development's need for new capital facilities and how
the required fees meet that need. 131 Thus, exempting impact fees from
takings jurisprudence does not leave landowners unprotected from
out-and-out plans of extortion because state action violating the more
stringent requirements of the dual rational nexus test would be held
invalid. 132
Additionally, scholars argue that takings analysis is improper
in its application to both impact fees and required physical dedications
because both are concerned with financing the infrastructure
necessary to service the land rather than restricting the use of land-
the traditional subject of takings jurisprudence. 133 The traditional
takings cases-Mugler, Euclid, Penn Central, Nollan, Dolan, and
Ehrlich-address how a land owner can or cannot use her land.134
Impact fees, on the other hand, address who should pay for
infrastructure.1 35 In summary, scholars argue that the dual rational
nexus test should be applied to impact fees to avoid the "takings
maze," protect property rights, and provide clearer guiding principles
to local governments. 36 Thus, federal courts should only validate fees
that comport with a state's dual rational nexus test.137
128. Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 366-67.
129. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 364-65.
130. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
131. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 365. But see CALLIES, FREILICH &
ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 270 (stating that precise mathematical calculations are not required
so long as the fee is not substantially in excess of the cost of the proportionate cost of the new
facilities).
132. Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 357, 360.
133. Id. at 358-60.
134. See id. at 359-60 (explaining the difference between the issue of impact fees and the
issues in traditional takings cases).
135. Id. at 360.
136. Id. at 367. Juergensmeyer and Nicholas also argue that the dual rational nexus test
should apply to physical dedications, but this Note does not take that stance.
137. Id.
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C. Nollan/Dolan Applies to Impact Fees Imposed Adjudicatively but
Not to Those Imposed Legislatively
Many courts have followed California's lead in applying
heightened scrutiny to adjudicatively imposed impact fees but not to
fees imposed legislatively. The California Supreme Court, in Ehrlich
v. City of Culver City, concluded that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to
impact fees adjudicatively imposed on an individual owner by an
administrative agency but not those generally imposed by legislative
ordinance. 138 In Ehrlich, a business owner closed his private athletic
club due to financial losses and petitioned the city to rezone the parcel
to allow for condominium construction. 139 Because it lacked health and
fitness amenities, Culver City conditioned rezoning on payment of a
$280,000 impact fee to be used for partial replacement of the lost
facilities, and an additional $33,200 payment for the city's "art in
public places" program. 140 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Dolan.14'
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court concluded that
Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny applied to impact fees but only in
the narrow class of land-use cases involving adjudicatively imposed
fees. 142
Since Ehrlich, California has bifurcated impact fee cases:
impact fees imposed adjudicatively on an individual property owner by
an administrative agency are subject to Nollan/Dolan heightened
scrutiny, but impact fees imposed via legislation fall within the
government's police power and are not subject to heightened
scrutiny. 143 The Ehrlich court noted that both Nollan and Dolan
discuss the government's imposition of an individual land-use
condition on a discretionary basis.1 44 In these ad hoc situations, land
owners and regulatory agencies "bargain" for development rights and
benefits, "purportedly offset[ting] the impact of the proposed
138. Curtin & Talbert, supra note 23, at 337.
139. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 434 (Cal. 1996).
140. Id. at 434-35.
141. Id. at 436. The very fact that the Supreme Court remanded Ehrlich to be reconsidered
in light of Dolan has led some to believe that the Court may be willing to apply Dolan to impact
fees. See Bringardner, supra note 79, at 585 (noting that the remand of Ehrlich "make[s] no
sense unless the U.S. Supreme Court believes monetary exactions may also be subject to the
heightened scrutiny of Dolan").
142. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 439.
143. Curtin & Talbert, supra note 23, at 337.
144. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 439. But see DANA & MERRILL, supra note 9, at 227 (stating that
the exactions at issue in No~lan and Dolan were imposed pursuant to general government
practice).
1336 [Vol. 62:4:1315
ESCAPING THE TAKINGS MAZE
development." 145 This unique context presents an inherent and
heightened risk that the government will use its police power to
impose dedications unrelated to legitimate ends, avoid payment of just
compensation, and unfairly place the majority of the burdens on the
property owner. 146 The application of Nollan/Dolan heightened
scrutiny, the court asserted, would dispel this issue as it concerns
these adjudicatively imposed impact fees by assuring a link between
the ends sought and the means taken. 147
In the more common situation of legislatively imposed impact
fees, however, where the exaction is imposed pursuant to legislation or
a rule of general applicability, heightened scrutiny would not apply.
148
In those situations, all similarly situated landowners are subject to
the same fee schedule, reducing the risk that an individual landowner
will be singled out for extraordinary concessions. 4
9
Commentators have described the Ehrlich approach as a
sensible middle ground in the impact fee debate. 150 A substantial
number of states have followed Ehrlich in making the
legislative/adjudicative distinction and now apply Nollan/Dolan
heightened scrutiny only to legislatively imposed impact fees.15' While
these states argue that they benefit from a bright line rule, 52 the line
between legislatively and adjudicatively imposed fees is often
blurred. 153 Even the question of whether Nollan and Dolan involved
exactions imposed adjudicatively or legislatively is debated. 54 In
145. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 438.
146. Id. at 439; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 97-98 (1980) (discussing briefly that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to protect
individuals from bearing a disproportionate cost of providing for the common good).
147. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 439.
148. CALLIES, CURTIN & TAPPENDORF, supra note 92, at 24; Curtin & Talbert, supra note 23,
at 339-40.
149. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001). For a detailed
analysis of the Krupp decision, see Reznick, supra note 7, at 741-44.
150. CALLIES, CURTIN & TAPPENDORF, supra note 92, at 25; Curtin & Talbert, supra note 23,
at 340.
151. See CALLIES, CURTIN & TAPPENDORF, supra note 92, at 25-28 (providing a brief
overview of cases in various states following Ehrlich and stating that "[n]ationally, a trend has
emerged in favor of the Ehrlich approach"); Curtin & Talbert, supra note 23, at 340-41 (listing
Arizona, Maryland, Minnesota, Washington, and Colorado as following the Ehrlich trend);
Reznick, supra note 7, at 740-41 (adding Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas to the list).
152. CALLIES, CURTIN & TAPPENDORF, supra note 92, at 25; Curtin & Talbert, supra note 23,
at 340.
153. E.g., B.A.M. Dev. v. Salt Lake County, 128 P.3d 1161, 1170 (2006) ("Some land-use
decisions fall neatly within the legislative/adjudicative categorical framework. Most do not.");
Bosselman, supra note 23, at 352 ("Even more difficult to define precisely is the distinction
between legislatively imposed fees and fees determined on an ad hoc basis.").
154. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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truth, municipal discretionary powers "exist along a continuum and
seldom fall into the neat categories of a fully predetermined legislative
exaction or a completely discretionary administrative determination
as to the appropriate exaction."'155 Even where a line can be drawn, the
distinction may not be appropriate because applying different
standards of review based on the adjudicative/legislative distinction is
at odds with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which is
indifferent to the mechanism the state uses when conditioning a
benefit on the surrender of a right.156  If the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions applies, heightened scrutiny always will
be appropriate, regardless of the adjudicative/legislative distinction. 5 7
Additionally, having scrutiny turn on the
adjudicative/legislative distinction is problematic because
municipalities faced with heightened judicial scrutiny simply will shift
the types of exactions imposed, often to the detriment of both the
developer and the municipality. 158 For instance, instead of imposing
"high-scrutiny" adjudicative impact fees, a municipality might choose
simply to impose all impact fees through "low-scrutiny" legislative
enactments. A municipality gains the advantage of minimized
scrutiny, but imposing all impact fees legislatively eliminates the
individual determinations of costs and benefits, thereby treating
developers arbitrarily and possibly reducing returns to the city. 15 9
Both developers and governments can benefit when fees are tailored
specifically to a particular project. 160
Finally, drawing a bright-line rule may have an effect on who
bears the ultimate cost of impact fees. Predictable, legislatively
imposed fees that are applicable to all builders let builders know what
fees to expect and whether to shift those fees either forward to buyers
or backward to land sellers.' 61 Where impact fees are imposed
155. Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 266 (2000); cf. PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF &
CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 838
(10th ed. 2003) (discussing the difficulties in distinguishing between adjudication and legislative
rulemaking when deciding whether due process applies).
156. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 9, at 226-27; cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1415, 1433-34 (1989) (discussing cases involving the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions without regard to whether the conditions were imposed legislatively
or adjudicatively).
157. See Sullivan, supra note 156, at 1421-22 (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to
state action constituting an unconstitutional condition).
158. Bosselman, supra note 23, at 348.
159. Id. at 348-49.
160. Id.
161. See Nicholas, supra note 8, at 96 (stating that this forward shifting can only occur
where all developers bear the same exaction cost or demand is sufficiently inelastic, i.e., demand
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adjudicatively in a less uniform system, the burden of paying the fees
falls on builders, who lose the opportunity to shift costs. 162 This may
have the unintended consequence of discouraging development and
contributing to shortages. 163 However, when municipalities follow the
requirement of the dual rational nexus test and make considerable
efforts to quantify (1) the needs created by new development and (2)
how a fee meets those needs, it seems far-fetched that "surprise"
exactions will leave a developer holding the bag. Thus, adherence to
the dual rational nexus test may sufficiently address the concerns
faced by the Ehrlich court and obviate the need to distinguish between
impact fees imposed adjudicatively and legislatively.
D. Nollan/Dolan Applies to All Impact Fees
Other scholars have argued that all forms of development
exactions should be subject to heightened scrutiny equally. 164 Both
developers and local governments want rules that facilitate the deal-
making process, and neither is overly concerned about the form of the
exaction. 16 5 Governments want developments that pay taxes and bring
jobs and exactions that avoid complaints from residents concerning
the type, quality, and cost of services they receive. 166 Developers are
concerned about net cash outlays and limitations in profitability
attributed to the exactions (minus the added value the exactions
provide).1 67 Neither is too concerned about the form of the exaction.1 68
Therefore, if the Dolan test provides sufficient protection and
reviewability for physical exactions, it should be applied to all forms of
exaction. 169
Applying heightened scrutiny to land dedications but not to
impact fees would encourage cities to require fees instead of land
dedications and may negatively affect both developers and cities.1 70
Developers often prefer to dedicate land rather than money because
remains constant as prices increase due to the forward shifting of impact fees); see also Nelson,
supra note 8, at 93-94 (stating that in noncompetitive markets forward shifting can occur, but
that generally in competitive markets builders require land sellers to internalize the fee).
162. Nicholas, supra note 8, at 97.
163. Id.
164. Bosselman, supra note 23, at 345.
165. Id. at 345-46.
166. Id. at 346.
167. Id.
168. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the differing objectives of governments and
developers, see Leitner & Schoettle, supra note 110, at 73.
169. Bosselman, supra note 23, at 346.
170. Id. at 347.
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developers generally have more land available than funding. 171 Also,
by dedicating land the developer can ensure that the park, school, or
widened street required by the municipality benefits its development,
generating more profit. 172 Additionally, it is to the city's advantage to
assess fees or dedications without worrying about the legal distinction
between the two.1 73 Generally, cities bargain for exactions to keep
services high and general taxation low,1 74 and they prefer to engage in
the bargaining process without having to modify their behavior simply
to achieve a lower standard of judicial review. 175
IV. SOLUTION: THE DUAL RATIONAL NEXUS TEST IS BEST
Courts should not apply Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny to
impact fees but should exempt impact fees altogether from takings
jurisprudence. Impact fees compliant with state dual rational nexus
tests should be upheld, and those that do not comply with these tests
should be invalidated. Three reasons support this conclusion. First,
the Supreme Court twice has reaffirmed unanimously that it will not
extend Nollan and Dolan beyond the special context of physical
exactions of land. 176 Second, impact fees are not a proper subject of
any takings jurisprudence because no property right is "at stake."
Finally, the risks associated with monetary exactions are best
ameliorated by the more stringent dual rational nexus test.
A. The Supreme Court Does Not Extend Nollan and Dolan Beyond the
Special Context of Physical Exactions
Twice a unanimous Supreme Court has held that Nollan/Dolan
heightened scrutiny applies only to physical dedications of land
exacted in exchange for the granting of a discretionary permit when,
absent the exchange, the dedication would be a per se taking.177 As
this may be the clearest decree in the canon of takings law, disturbing
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 347-48.
174. See id. at 346 (describing the city's interest in developments that contribute taxes which
can be used to support the provision of additional services).
175. See id. at 352 (noting that "the legal fees associated with litigating the boundary lines
between the various categories of exaction will penalize both developers and cities").
176. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005); City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). The crucial language from Del Monte Dunes limiting
Nollan/Dolan to physical dedications of land is in Part II of the opinion, which was specifically
agreed to by the dissent. 526 U.S. at 733 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-47; Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702.
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it would be lamentable. Lingle's plain statement that Nollan/Dolan
only applies to the special context of physical takings can only be
confused by applying Nollan/Dolan to impact fees. Impact fees are not
physical takings, and physical takings deserve heightened
constitutional scrutiny because of the unique manner in which they
infringe upon constitutionally protected liberties.
1. Physical Appropriations Deserve Heightened Constitutional
Scrutiny
Physical exactions of land merit heightened scrutiny.
Government action that actually appropriates private land or divests
the owner of title to property is particularly burdensome on individual
liberties and always has demanded just compensation. 178 As the
Takings Clause has expanded over the centuries to include protection
from takings by regulation, judicial scrutiny of actual physical
appropriation has endured, and its raison d'tre remains
undisputed. 179 Physical exactions intrude on the use and enjoyment of
land, the right to exclude others, the right to transfer property, and
other protected property rights. These rights, when destroyed by
government action, constitute considerable invasion and interference
that warrant Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny.180 On the other hand,
impact fees do not restrict or regulate the use or enjoyment of land;
impact fees leave no intrusive easements; impact fees do not burden
the right to transfer property. In short, impact fees in no way cause
harm similar to the harms that give rise to a Nollan/Dolan heightened
concern. Paying the fees leaves property totally unburdened.
Commentators argue that physical and monetary exactions
should be treated equally because, in a business deal between
developers and the government, the form an exaction takes is
inconsequential.18' Even assuming that developers and municipalities
do not care much about the form an exaction takes, it must be
178. See BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, supra note 33, at 51, 99-103 (discussing the
historical foundations of the Takings Clause).
179. Id. at 254.
180. Contra Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 366-67 (arguing that land
dedications are just another form of financing public infrastructure improvements and therefore
should be exempt from takings analysis). Justice Kennedy's list of land dedication cases,
however, shows that land dedications are about much more than just financing public
infrastructure. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (listing takings cases in which the land-use regulations were unrelated to
public financing).
181. See Bosselman, supra note 23, at 346-47 (arguing that what matters is the bottom line
and the benefits and burdens of the exaction).
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remembered that not everyone is a developer or a municipality, and
the form of the exaction can be of tremendous concern. The Nollans,
for example, were not developers but owners of a single-family home
who sought a discretionary permit to build a larger home on their
coastal lot. Families often care a great deal about their right to
exclude others from their property. Paying fees is one thing; having
strangers trample through the children's sandbox is a different
concern altogether. The former implicates little constitutional concern
for the family seeking a remodeling permit; the latter implicates
tremendous concerns. This reasoning, of course, is not limited to
families. It is likely that most landowners care about who has access
to their property. And developers, who have to assuage buyers'
concerns about the rights running with the property they purchase,
also care about the form an exaction takes. The unique nature of
property and concern over government invasion of its use and
enjoyment justify heightened scrutiny for physical exactions without
requiring similar scrutiny of impact fees. Therefore, the Supreme
Court's language in Lingle and Del Monte Dunes that treats physical
takings of land differently is reasonable and should remain
unmolested.
2. Impact Fees Do Not Amount to Per Se Physical Takings as Is
Required for Heightened Scrutiny
Nollan and Dolan are limited to cases in which, if the
government had acted outside the bargaining context, its actions
would amount to a per se physical taking. Impact fees do not amount
to per se physical takings; thus, Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny
does not apply. In both Nollan and Dolan, the government had
discretion whether to approve a petitioner's application for a building
permit.18 2 In each instance, the government approved the permit
subject to the condition that a portion of the petitioner's land be
dedicated as a public easement.18 3 The conditions were "so onerous,"
said the Supreme Court, "that, outside the exaction context, they
would be deemed per se physical takings." 18 4 Because the government
182. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 380 (1994) (involving a permit subject to denial on
account of Dolan's intention to build within the one-hundred-year floodplain); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987) (involving a development conditioned upon the
Nollans obtaining a coastal development permit). But see Richard A. Epstein, Forward:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61
(1989) (stating that Nollan never had to reach the question of unconstitutional conditions).
183. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
184. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005).
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could not appropriate the easements directly without paying
compensation, it likewise could not condition permit approval on
dedicating the easements.185 Thus, when looking at the situation
outside the exaction context, the taking would be unconstitutional.
Contrarily, when the government requires impact fees, the
grant of a permit is not contingent on the landowner surrendering a
right that, outside the exaction context, would be deemed a per se
physical taking. Indeed, the government does not require the property
owner to surrender any constitutionally protected property right at
all; the government merely conditions the permit on payment of
money. Only if the government demanded a fee that was so onerous
that outside the exaction it would be deemed a per se physical taking
could Nollan/Dolan's heightened scrutiny apply.18 6 Certainly ordinary
fees do not rise to this level. An ordinary fee may interfere with
reasonable investment-backed expectations or have an economic
impact, but those concerns implicate Penn Central review and are
insufficient to reach Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.
It seems the only conceivable way for an impact fee to result in
a per se physical taking is to imagine an impact fee so high that it
deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of his property.
This situation is similar to Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
in which a developer was denied the right to build any permanent
structure on his beachfront property.187 The Supreme Court
recognized that government regulations totally depriving owners of all
economically beneficial use of property are per se takings.188 However,
in two situations Lucas's per se rule is limited by other Supreme Court
precedent: (1) total deprivation of all beneficial use on only a fraction
of a parcel is not a per se taking,18 9 and (2) total deprivation of all
beneficial use for a temporary period is not a per se taking. 190 Penn
Central, not Lucas, governs instances in which a less-than-total
deprivation of all economically beneficial use is at issue. 19' Applying
Lucas and these two Lucas-limiting cases to impact fees leads to a
conclusion that a fee that approximates actual appropriation-a fee so
185. Id. at 546-47; cf. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 1415 (describing the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions).
186. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-47.
187. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008-09 (1992).
188. Id. at 1030-31.
189. Palazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
190. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
331 (2002).
191. Id. at 321 (holding that "the circumstances in this case [involving a temporary
moratorium] are best analyzed within the Penn Central framework").
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high that any and all reasonable, economically beneficial use is
precluded-may be a per se taking. Such fees would have to be
astronomical, however, to deny a developer all economically beneficial
use. Anything less than a total deprivation of all economically
beneficial use is merely a fractional deprivation, conceivably can be
paid, and, once paid, all property rights remain. Because a less-than-
astronomical fee can conceivably be paid without total deprivation of
economically beneficial use, Lucas's concern of per se taking of
physical property mirroring physical appropriation is not an issue.
Rather, impact fees appear more like total takings on a fraction of
land or total takings for a temporary period: the fees may seriously
hamper development but do not preclude development. Thus, if
takings jurisprudence must apply, the Penn Central test should
govern. 192
Finally, even if a court found that an impact fee could and did
deprive an owner of all reasonable, economically beneficial use of his
property, the court could invalidate the fee easily under Lucas and
avoid a contorted Nollan/Dolan analysis. Thus, if one forces regulatory
takings jurisprudence on impact fees, either Lucas or Penn Central
would govern rather than Nollan/Dolan. This result is unacceptable
because it leaves property owners insufficiently protected: Penn
Central applies no heightened scrutiny, and Lucas situations are too
rare. 
193
B. No Property Right Is "at Stake" When Governments Impose Impact
Fees
Impact fees do not regulate land use and, therefore, should be
exempt not only from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny, but from all takings
jurisprudence. The subject of regulatory takings jurisprudence always
has been ordinances regulating land use,194 such as easements,
transfers in title, changes in permitted use, or other alterations in the
192. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (instructing that the
pertinent test involves a consideration of the "interference with [distinct] investment-backed
expectations" and the "economic impact").
193. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (calling per se takings "relatively rare"). This author questions
whether fees denying all economically beneficial use of property can ever be involved in a
development deal. See supra Part IV.A.ii (discussing the necessity for fees to be infinitely high
for Lucas to apply).
194. See Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 366 ("[Tlakings cases and principles
should and largely do focus on use restrictions placed on land.").
1344 [Vol. 62:4:1315
ESCAPING THE TAKINGS MAZE
"bundle" of rights associated with the property.195 Further, the
Supreme Court always has dismissed takings challenges when the
interests in need of protection are not sufficiently bound up with
reasonable expectations to constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment
purposes. 196 The crux of the issue, therefore, is whether an impact fee
triggers the Takings Clause because it results from government
regulation measured by, applicable to, operating upon, or altering an
identifiable property interest, 97 or whether the clause is not triggered
because the fee is merely an attempt to adjust the benefits and
burdens of economic life. 198 The latter is the better understanding.
Impact fees result in no alterations of property rights. The fees do not
deny uses, regulate uses, leave easements, permit invasion, condemn
rights, transfer title, or alter any property interest or right. Payment
of impact fees leaves all property interests-all the "sticks" in the
bundle of rights-intact. The fees only make the exercise of the right
to develop more expensive. Impact fees are better viewed as attempts
to raise funds for infrastructure improvement and to adjust the
benefits and burdens of economic life, which is not traditionally a
subject of takings jurisprudence. 199 Though some commentators argue
that both physical and monetary exactions share the purpose of
funding infrastructure improvements and should not be subject to
takings jurisprudence, 200 physical exactions also directly regulate land
use and alter property rights. Thus, takings jurisprudence is
appropriately applied to physical exactions and not impact fees.
Although impact fees, as Justice Kennedy would say in Eastern
Enterprises, may "regard" and "operate upon" property, applying
takings jurisprudence to every regulation that "regards" and "operates
upon" property expands the reach of the Fifth Amendment too far and
unreasonably blurs the line between due process and takings
analyses. Takings analysis already has expanded from administering
195. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (stating that takings jurisprudence has traditionally been
guided by the citizens' understanding of the "bundle of rights" accompanying title to property
and the state's power over those rights).
196. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25.
197. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that a piece of legislation did not take property because it "d[id] not
operate upon or alter an identified property interest, and it [wa]s not applicable to or measured
by a property interest").
198. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25.
199. Bosselman, supra note 23, at 347-48; Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 360.
200. Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 358-60 (discussing cases from the mid-
1970s and early 1980s and describing the "original sin" of labeling required dedications and "in
lieu of' payments as land-use regulations).
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only physical appropriation and divesting of title20 1 to administering
all land-use regulations. 20 2 Though now reasonably limited to land-use
regulations, 20 3 Justice Kennedy's language, if adopted as a new test for
takings analysis, would expand the Takings Clause to any government
action "regarding" or "operating upon" a property right.20 4 According to
this interpretation, impact fees "operate upon" property and are
imposed according to the size of the property and the impact of its use,
thus subjecting the fees to takings analysis. 205 But to what degree of
attenuation could the "regarding" and "operate upon" language be
stretched? Do mining fees "operate upon" property rights? What about
patent registration fees? Vehicle licensing fees? Any fee could "regard"
or "operate upon" property and thus merit Takings Clause protection.
Also, considering the uncertain distinction between fees and taxes, 20 6
it would not be inconceivable to see courts apply the Takings Clause to
taxes that "operate upon" property. Softening the Takings Clause's
outer limit essentially transforms the Clause from a protection against
invasion of property rights and use regulations to a protection against
any government action that even remotely concerns property.
Rather than limiting their focus to whether government action
"operates upon" property, courts would be wise to consider Justice
Kennedy's concern as to whether "a specific property right or interest
[is] at stake."20 7 Examples of "at stake" property interests in past cases
include permanent public easements, total deprivation of the right to
build, or denial of the right to use air space. 208 In Lingle, Justice
Kennedy agreed in his concurrence that these cases share a common
touchstone: they identify regulatory action that is functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which "government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. '20 9
Demanding large, onerous fees in exchange for a discretionary permit
201. BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, supra note 33, at 106.
202. Id. at 141.
203. See supra note 194.
204. If presently there is "great uncertainty about the scope of th[e] Court's takings
jurisprudence," as suggested by Justice Stevens in Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866, applying takings
analysis to all state action "operating upon" property rights would likely add to the confusion. It
is difficult to believe that Justice Kennedy, after lamenting that regulatory takings cases are
some of the most "litigated and perplexing in current law," intended to open up a new category of
government regulation to takings analysis. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205. Reznick, supra note 7, at 755.
206. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 283-89 (discussing takings and taxation).
207. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 541-42.
209. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
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does not destroy the right to build, nor is it the functional equivalent
of a direct appropriation or ouster, and thus it does not put a property
right "at stake."210 Particularly onerous or arbitrarily imposed fees
may compromise some other protected right but not the right to take
private property for public use. Thus, the rational limit of the Takings
Clause should be maintained by applying the clause only to land-use
regulations when a property right is at stake and not to impact fees
that seek merely to determine how public infrastructure
improvements will be financed.
Additionally, impact fees do not raise the same concerns over
property rights that justify review under the Takings Clause. The
concern at the heart of the Takings Clause is that the state will use its
eminent domain power to obtain rights in property that rightfully can
be obtained only by paying just compensation. 211 This concern applies
to physical exactions; thus, takings jurisprudence and heightened
scrutiny prevent the government from using either condemnation or
bargaining to avoid paying just compensation.21 2 With impact fees,
however, there is no concern that the state is trying to take property
without paying just compensation; the state obtains no property
interest during the process. Furthermore, applying the Takings
Clause to impact fees would mean that the government could "take"
an excessive fee only as long as it pays just compensation for that
fee.21 3 Requiring payment of just compensation for a cash demand is
nonsensical.
Classifying impact fees as takings-exempt financing
regulations instead of takings-governed land-use regulations is both
useful and manageable. Not only will one category of government
action be removed from the "takings maze," but it can be done without
changing current federal takings laws, which presently do not
encompass impact fees. Further, courts easily can distinguish
government action regulating property use from fundraising for
infrastructure improvements. Infrastructure financing regulations
raise a different set of concerns than land-use regulations and thus
210. Cf. Palazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631-32 (2001) (holding against the takings
claim where regulations reduced a property's developable acres from eighteen to two but where
there was no total deprivation of economic use).
211. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 9, at 3-4.
212. Cf. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) (stating that California
could proceed by using its power of eminent domain, but "if it wants an easement across the
Nollans' property, it must pay for it").
213. See Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 364 (explaining that the damages to a
property owner for an excessive impact fee must equal the interest on the reasonable value of
what had been taken).
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are deserving of different treatment in the courts. 214 Whereas the
constitutional concern with land-use regulation is that the
government will appropriate or interfere with a property right without
paying just compensation, the concern with financing regulation is
that the government will impose arbitrary and abusive fees.215 Courts
can address that concern better outside takings analysis by using the
dual rational nexus test.
Removing the Takings Clause analysis does not necessarily
mean that impact fees would or should be subject to due process
review. The due process clause of the Constitution states that citizens
shall not be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."216 This clause protects citizens from arbitrary and capricious
government action that is fundamentally unfair 217 and "infringe [s on]
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law. ' 218 Courts apply strict scrutiny
only when fundamental liberties are infringed, and greater deference
is granted to states regulating non-fundamental liberties such as
economic interests. 219 Because impact fees are devices designed to
facilitate infrastructure improvement financing that implicates
economic interests, it is difficult to fathom courts treating the fees
with heightened scrutiny. 220 Considering the serious issues that
excessive fees raise, especially regarding the fear of extortion,
substantive due process review provides insufficient protection.
214. Id. at 365-66.
215. See id. at 367 (stating the different purposes in land-use regulations and impact fees).
216. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
217. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 557 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Due Process Clause "can offer protection against" laws that are "fundamentally unfair
because of [their] retroactivity").
218. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by Day-
Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963).
219. MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930S 192 (2001); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483, 487 (1955) (stating that it is for legislatures, not courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of economic regulations).
220. When determining whether a right is "fundamental," courts should consider
"fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Washington v. Glucksburg, 521
U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). Courts also can consider that "at the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Either path you take, it is
hard to see how impact fees deny a fundamental liberty interest.
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C. The Risks Associated with Infrastructure
Financing Regulations Can Best Be Mitigated by Application
of the Dual Rational Nexus Test
Courts should apply the common-law dual rational nexus test
to all impact fees. The dual rational nexus test provides protection
that is more stringent than that provided by the other federal takings
tests. Whereas Penn Central merely requires a weighing of factors and
Nollan/Dolan requires "rough proportionality" and an "essential
nexus," the dual rational nexus test requires a specific analysis of the
needs created by the development and the funds collected to be used to
benefit the development. Thus, courts actually increase protection of
private property rights by exempting impact fees from federal takings
analysis.
The Ehrlich approach-applying Nollan/Dolan heightened
scrutiny only to adjudicatively imposed fees-insufficiently protects
against government abuse. A central reason for applying Nollan/Dolan
heightened scrutiny to impact fees is the fear of "out-and-out plans of
extortion."221 In Ehrlich, for example, the court argued that applying
heightened scrutiny is necessary to ensure that governments do not
use their monopoly power over development permits to impose
illegitimate conditions lacking logical connection to the impact of the
proposed development. 222 Extortion concerns increase when political
constraints on the legislative process are weak.223 Thus, courts
following Ehrlich apply heightened scrutiny to impact fees that are
imposed adjudicatively but not to those imposed legislatively. 224 This
view reflects a longstanding distrust of state legislatures' propensity
to protect citizens' rights. 225 Early Americans, however, not only
feared the ad hoc decisions of government officials but also mistrusted
all legislative decisions. 226 Governmental abuse can occur with either
type of decision. If the result is a constitutional violation, the manner
through which it was imposed should not matter. The Ehrlich
approach only increases constitutional protection from the danger of
221. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994); accord Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,
911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996).
222. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 444.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 447.
225. Treanor, supra note 35, at 704-05.
226. Id.
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an arbitrary administrative body; the threat posed by irrational,
legislatively imposed fees is left undeterred.
Additionally, applying heightened scrutiny to administrative
and not legislative decisions incentivizes a shift of fee decisions to
legislatures that then would set the fees in generally applicable
rules.227 Generally applicable rules, because of their rigidity, may be
more likely than adjudicative rules to yield unfair results 228 because
they reduce the ability of developers and the government to barter. 229
Contrary to the Ehrlich court's belief that only the government has a
strong hand at the bargaining table, local governments often want to
attract development and even waive fees to attract economically
beneficial land-use projects. 230 Therefore, it is possible that both
parties would disfavor legislatively imposed fees.
Even if Nollan and Dolan applied to both legislatively and
adjudicatively imposed impact fees, they would provide less protection
from extortion than the dual rational nexus test. The dual rational
nexus test demands (1) extensively calculating the impact of a
proposed development on infrastructure and (2) earmarking the fees
to benefit the development. 231 Though Dolan does require some sort of
relationship between the nature and extent of the impact, no
individualized mathematical calculation is required-the test only
demands that the determination be "roughly proportional."232 The
"rough proportionality" language of Dolan is appropriate in physical
dedications, where it is understandably difficult to create an exact
accounting of a need for land. For example, the amount of land that
needs to be dedicated to improve water drainage or the types of
easements that can reduce psychological barriers to beaches are not
easy to calculate. But where more exact calculations are possible, as is
the case with capital financing through impact fees, rough estimates
are inappropriate. Governments and developers are expertly qualified
to make cost projections. Requiring detailed, specific projections of
needs and benefits before imposing impact fees provides a substantial
check on government extortion-even greater than would be available
under Nollan/Dolan's heightened scrutiny.
227. Bosselman, supra note 23, at 348.
228. Cf. id. at 352 (explaining that "the distinction between a development exaction and a
denial of development approval isn't easy to make in complex cases").
229. Cf. id. (noting that "[d]evelopment negotiations can be very intricate" and that "any
potential land dedication creates a whole new set of decisions about fees to be paid").
230. Id. at 350.
231. Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supra note 23, at 362-63; Leitner & Schoettle, supra note
110, at 61-62 (listing the factors weighed when analyzing impact fees).
232. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
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Courts should not incorporate the dual rational nexus test for
monetary exactions into takings jurisprudence as they did the rational
relationship test for physical exactions. In addition to the special
constitutional concerns of property rights and the inapplicability of
the Takings Clause to impact fees, analysis of the dual rational nexus
test requires review of the detailed, fact-specific calculus used to
determine the benefits and burdens of the actions reviewed. State
courts have managed to handle such a calculus for two decades. 233
Federal courts should exempt impact fees from federal takings
analysis and review impact fees under state dual rational nexus tests.
Courts can best protect against fears of extortion, avoid further
muddling the Takings Clause, and leave detailed analyses of benefits
to experienced state courts by refusing to apply takings analysis to
monetary exactions regardless of whether the exactions are
legislatively or adjudicatively imposed.23 4
V. CONCLUSION
As cities like Naples seek to fund the infrastructure
improvements necessary to serve growing populations in the face of
limited state and federal resource contributions, impact fees will
continue to play a vital role. Builders, forced to bargain with local
governmental entities holding monopoly power over the grant of
building permits, are rightly concerned about impact fees that amount
to little more than "out-and-out plans of extortion." Appling the dual
rational nexus test to impact fees is the best way for courts to protect
the rights of property owners, facilitate the collection of only necessary
impact fees, and ensure that the funds generated from those fees
benefit the targeted party. These benefits are not sufficiently
protected under Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny. Besides these
practical advantages, reviewing impact fees under the dual rational
nexus test and not Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny follows
unanimous decisions by the Supreme Court that reserve a distinct
place in takings jurisprudence for actual appropriation, destruction, or
invasion of property. Finally, exempting impact fees from takings
jurisprudence maintains a definable and reasonable outer limit to the
government's power under the Takings Clause-government action
233. Texas adopted the first impact fee in 1987, and now twenty-seven states have impact
fee statutes. See MULLEN, supra note 119.
234. Cf. Note, supra note 28, at 1001 ("[T]he Court has expressed deep-seated doubts about
the competence of judges, working from the federal Constitution alone, to construct detailed
equations of harm and benefit in an effort to second-guess legislatures.").
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that actually regulates the use of property and causes specific,
identifiable property rights to be "at stake."
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